My sincere gratitude to my mentees Angella and Eden for doing an amazing research on Tunisia. Their dedication to details and the truth is my pride.
The Tunisian revolution also called the Jasmine Revolution, named after Jasmine, Tunisia’s national flower; was a series of street demonstrations that took place throughout Tunisia from 17th December 2010 till 14th January 2011 leading to the overthrow of the longtime President Zine el-Abedin Ben Ali. The Jasmine Revolution was triggered by the self-immolation of Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi whose death sparked enormous protests which spread throughout Tunisia and later spread to other neighboring Arab countries in the region; inspiring what became known as the “Arab Spring”.
Ben Ali’s regime used propaganda PR messages, data manipulations, and clampdowns to create the illusion of stability, economic prosperity, and growing liberal democracy. However, the middle-class socioeconomic status was sliding steadily as the Trabelsi-Ben Ali business empire devoured the traditional business class, sidelining investors and harassing entrepreneurs and small business owners. Few weeks before the revolution, in its 2010 Country Brief on Tunisia; The World Bank stated that Tunisia had made remarkable progress on equitable growth, fighting poverty and achieving good social indicators and went on to congratulate Tunisia on being far ahead in terms of government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality. All the statements were removed from the World Bank website in the days after Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia
In comparison with other more violent protests in other parts of the Arab World, the Tunisian revolution was comparatively un-violent. However, it was not entirely non-violent as is often assumed. According to official figures from Tunisian authorities, 338 people died during the Tunisian revolution. Even so, the protests and change in government were achieved with minimal use of violence.
The name Jasmine Revolution was used only in foreign media and is not widely used in Tunisia itself. The name is said to have been coined by a Tunisian journalist, Zied El Hani, who first used it in his blog post published on 13th January 2011 and initially spread via social media such as Facebook (hence “Revolution Facebook” among the youth of Tunisia). Ben Ali’s rise to power in 1987 was also called the Jasmine Revolution. In Tunisia, the name adopted for the 2011 revolution was the Dignity Revolution, which is a translation of the Tunisian Arabic name for the revolution, Thawrat al-Karāmah. Tunisian protest demanded basic human rights and dignity, thus the name, the Tunisian Dignity Revolution (Landorf, 2014, p. 56).
This essay discusses how the Jasmine Revolution unfolded, the factors that caused it and finally the place of women in the Jasmine Revolution. To assess the Jasmine revolution, it is important to first consider the background of the Ben Ali regime, therefore to read Part 1 and 2 ( check my previous posts)
Tarek El-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi
The Tunisian revolution was triggered by the death of Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi on 17th December 2010. Bouazizi, a 26 years old Tunisian vendor had been supporting his family by selling fruit from a cart in his hometown, Sidi Bouzid (300 km south of Tunis). On 17th December 2010, he had his cart and produce confiscated by a police officer, Famid Hamdi. He was tasked with confiscating products from vendors without licenses. It stated that when she tried to confiscate Bouazizi’s products, a scuffle ensued and she called the police who then beat Bouazizi. Humiliated, Bouazizi went to the local municipality to complain and to have his products returned but he was refused an audience. Frustrated and to protest his treatment at the hands of authorities; Bouazizi poured a flammable liquid on himself and set himself on fire in front of the local municipality building (Mulrine, 2011, p. 17). Bouazizi was transferred to a hospital where he died on 4th January 2011. The incident of Bouazizi self-immolation sparked public outrage and that same day, protests broke out in Sidi Bouzid. Hundreds of young people protested in solidarity with Bouazizi against rising unemployment and increasing prices (Nassar, 2016, p. 14).
On the first family’s side, during the last weeks of December 2010; they were preoccupied with where to spend the New Year’s celebrations. Because the first lady, Leila Trabelsi had just undergone plastic surgery and a planned trip to Malaysia was canceled; Ben Ali threw a grand party for their 6-year-old son, before taking his family to Dubai (Tadros, 2016, p. 3).
On 22nd December, the first protests broke outside of Sidi Bouzid in the cities of Sidi Ali Ben Aoun, Menzel Bouziane Regueb and Meknassy. On that same day, 22-year-old Houcine Falhi committed suicide during a demonstration after having chanted “No to misery! No to unemployment” marking the first suicide inspired by Bouazizi took place in Sidi Bouzid (Nassar, 2016, p. 14).
On 26th December, nine days after Bouazizi lit himself up, the Minister of Interior informed Ben Ali that there were protests in the country; although the first case of a protester dying at the hands of the police had occurred two days earlier on 24th December in which Mohammed Ammari, an 18-year-old protester was shot in the chest and killed by police in Menzel Bouziane. Chawki Belhoussine El Hadri, a 44-year-old man was also shot by police at the same protest (he died 6 days later) (Nassar, 2016, p. 14). However, Ben Ali was dismissive to return because he didn’t want his son’s promised vacation to be interrupted by such petty issues; but two days later on 28th December as protests continued; Ben Ali reluctantly cut his vacation short, returned and was photographed posing next to Bouazizi and he gave his first speech to the nation. An uneasy calm took over as the New Year approached (Tadros, 2016, p. 4).
On 6th January, serious protests resumed. By 9th January, six protesters had died; with protests reaching the capital for the first time, but Ben Ali still impervious, admonished his ministers for forcing him to break his vacation. That same day, the country’s key security officials: Minister of Interior Rafiq Belhaj Kacem, Minister of Defense Ridha Grira, Army Chief of Staff General Rachid Ammar, Head of Military Intelligence General Ahmed Choubir, Head of Presidential Guard General Ali Seriati, the ruling party’s Secretary-General and a host of other security officials held a meeting to discuss ways to contain the protests which included deploying the military in the streets. A few days earlier it had been rumored that General Ammar had refused Ben Ali’s orders to shoot at protesters and Tunisians greeted the army’s deployment with cheers. The rumor coming from an opposition website was later confirmed as a deliberate act to sow mistrust within the regime (Tadros, 2016, p. 5). As the meeting was concluding, General Seriati asked the civilians present (Minister of Defense, Grira; Minister of Interior, Belhaj Kacem and the ruling party’s Secretary-General) to leave as the remaining part of the meeting would focus on technical security matters and they had little to contribute. Seriati’s request and apparent authority over the military officers present, made Grira suspicious of Seriati for planning a coup and he later called General Ammar to tell him not to follow anyone’s orders but his (Tadros, 2016, p. 5-6).
On 10th January, Ben Ali began to realize that the protests were serious. He once again addressed the nation, promised reforms and jobs and warned of unidentified terrorists using the instability to attack peaceful civilians. But the protests continued and two days later on 12th January, Ben Ali announced a government reshuffle; sacking the Interior Minister and replacing him with Ahmed Friaa (Tadros, 2016, p. 6). By this time, the Trabelsi family (the First Lady’s ten brothers and sisters and their children) which behaved like a mafia, with each member building their fiefdom as they monopolized a sector of the Tunisian economy; was scared by the protests and the insults hurled at them, and they asked the First Lady, Leila for permission to move to the palace for protection (Tadros, 2016, p. 6). And that same day, the head of the counterterrorism unit in the Interior Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Samir Tarhouni was dispatched to protect the ministry’s headquarters. He received a congratulatory phone call from an old friend, Colonel Larbi Lakhal, informing him that he had been appointed as head of the Specialized Unit of the National Guard.
The following day on 13th January, protests continued throughout the country; and fearing the prospect of their weapons falling into the wrong hands, police officers handed their guns to the newly deployed army. This act confirmed the suspicions of Minister of Defense, Grira; that a coup was in the making and he called Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, the new Minister of Interior Ahmed Friaa, and the Head of Military Intelligence General Ahmed Choubir; relaying his suspicions to them. Ben Ali had to call his suspicious minister to reassure him. That night, in another address to the nation, Ben Ali told them that he had not been told the truth and then things would change, that political prisoners would be released and censorship of the internet removed and that that would be his last term as president (Tadros, 2016, p. 7).
On 14th January, worried that planned protests would come close to the palace, General Seriati asked for a military helicopter to be flown above the capital to monitor the progress of protesters. The suspicious Grira fearing that Seriati would use the helicopter to shoot at the palace as part of his imagined coup ordered an armed military officer to accompany the helicopter to make sure nothing went wrong; and by noon, it was in the air. It landed at 3 o’clock for refueling and quickly went back in the air but this second time, Seriati was not informed (Tadros, 2016, p. 7).
That same day, at 10:00 AM, as Ben Ali’s 22-year old daughter, Halima was having breakfast with her fiancé; she noticed the strangers who had spent the night in the palace and she was informed that they were her mother’s distant relatives who had taken shelter in the palace. She was enraged and called Seriati demanding that he finds a way to get rid of them. The Trabelsis soon made their way to the airport searching for airline tickets to leave the country (Tadros, 2016, p. 7).
Samir Tarhouni and his officers of the counterterrorism unit stationed at the Ministry of Interior were ill-equipped for the challenge they were facing and as protesters approached the ministry, Tarhouni realized that he would soon either fire on civilian protesters or allow them to storm the building and thus betray his duty, allowing weapons stored there to fall into the wrong hands. While contemplating what to do, he noticed a police radio report stating that protesters were close to the airport where his wife worked in air traffic control. Alarmed for the safety of his wife, he called an old friend who was a police officer in the airport and asked him about the chaos in the airport. His friend told him not to worry, that they were just trying to get the Trabelsis’ tickets; and this angered Tarhouni. He told his men that Ben Ali had lied when he promised changes and was having his family escape, that soon they would be forced to shoot at civilians and that when things calmed down the Ben Ali family would return and blame them for the killings. Tarhouni asked his men to join him and force the family to stay with them and share their fate. He then called his airport friend and asked him to delay the Trabelsis’ travel until he arrived (Tadros, 2016, p. 8).
Suddenly, Ben Ali’s daughter, Cyrine, was informed that her passport lacked an exit stamp and was not allowed to board a plane. Her bodyguard called her husband and told him. The pilot on another plane suddenly felt sick and the departure was delayed. At 2:35 PM, Tarhouni arrived at the airport with eleven soldiers and the rest of the counterterrorism unit officers with their soldiers joined him at 3:00 PM. As they stormed the airport, Tarhouni informed the airport director, Zouheir Bayeti that he had orders from above to arrest the Trabelsi family members. The counterterrorism unit’s clothes were similar to those of the Presidential Guard and the rumor quickly spread that the Presidential Guard was arresting the Trabelsis. Unwilling to fight Cyrine’s bodyguards and realizing that Ben Ali’s daughter from his first marriage was not important; Tarhouni allowed her to board her plane. Cyrine’s driver informed her frightened husband of the scene and he rushed to the presidential palace to inform Ben Ali (Tadros, 2016, p. 8).
Seriati called the airport director at 3:00 PM, to ask why Cyrine had trouble boarding her plane and the terrified man passed the phone to Tarhouni who assured Seriati that he would handle the matter. After the call, Seriati began to wonder why Tarhouni had answered him and what he was doing at the airport. Seriati called the director of the Interior Ministry’s travel department, asked him to call the airport director and put the phone on speaker. Still pretending he had orders from above, Tarhouni informed the director that he had prevented the Trabelsis from leaving. Horrified, Seriati rushed to Ben Ali’s office and on entering, he found Cyrine’s husband and driver there informing Ben Ali of what the driver had seen. Furious, Ben Ali decided to sack his newly appointed Interior Minister, given that the mutiny had taken place among his men, and put the ministry under the command of the army. Ben Ali called his Minister of Defense, Grira, and informed him of the hostage situation and declared a state of emergency. Grira mistrustful of the Army Chief of Staff, General Ammar because of what he perceived as his closeness to Seriati; dispatched him to the ministry to assume control and hence keep him away from the army command and the Head of Military Intelligence, General Ahmed Choubir, replaced him temporarily. And on hearing the news that members of her family had been taken hostage at the airport, Leila began to pack. Ben Ali decided to send his family to Saudi Arabia under the pretext that they would perform umrah (the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca) (Tadros, 2016, p. 9).
General Choubir had decided to send the military’s Special Forces to confront Tarhouni and his men. Tarhouni realized that he would soon be confronted with superior forces and remembered his conversation a few days earlier with his old friend Colonel Lakhal, the newly appointed head of the specialized unit of the National Guard. Tarhouni called him and informed him that he had received orders from above and that he had arrested the Trabelsis and needed backup help. Lakhal immediately sent him 40 of his men who were nearby and promised to gather the rest and join him as fast as possible. Repeating his tactic Tarhouni, called Colonel Zouheir el-Ouafi, the Head of the National Unit for Rapid Intervention (a unit he had headed until 2006 and knew most of its officers there) who told him that he would join him in ten minutes (Tadros, 2016, p. 9).
Tarhouni was pressed by Bayeti, the airport director about who exactly had sent him and to quiet him, Tarhouni told him that God had sent him. When Seriati’s assistant called Tarhouni trying to gather information as to who ordered him to act, he repeated the same line. With his military mindset unable to comprehend the possibility of mutiny, for Seriati, this only meant that Tarhouni was now working with the Islamists. At the same time, Seriati was informed that a helicopter was flying close to the presidential palace but unaware that this was the same helicopter he had requested in the morning; he began fearing a possible attack by the helicopter on the palace. Being the one ultimately responsible for the President’s life, Seriati informed Ben Ali that the situation was getting very dangerous and that he could no longer guarantee his safety in the palace. It was then better for Ben Ali to accompany his family to the military base next to the airport from which they would fly, as it would be safer for him there. Ben Ali called Grira and told him he would shoot down the helicopter but in doing so, he mistakenly told Grira the helicopter belonged to the counterterrorism unit. Grira called the Head of Air Force and ordered him to recall the counterterrorism helicopter, but the Air Force general insisted no such helicopter existed. For Grira, this imaginary helicopter was further proof that Seriati was trying to frighten Ben Ali to conduct his coup (Tadros, 2016, p. 9-10).
Though the President had had no intention of leaving the country himself, at 4:25 PM, accompanied by Seriati; Ben Ali and his family left the presidential palace heading to Louina military base and airport. Mistrustful of his own people, the Presidential Guard’s operation room was told that Ben Ali was heading to his private residence. But 15 minutes later the third-ranking officer in the Presidential Guard, Sami Sik Salem; discovered that Ben Ali had not reached the residence and he called his boss, Adnene Hattab, who told him to find a place to hide. At the moment, Sik Salem found himself in the same position as Tarhouni nearly three hours earlier; angered, feeling abandoned, and fearing that he would later be blamed for shooting at protesters. He decided to call Prime Minister Ghannouchi and informed him that Ben Ali had fled the country and that Tunisia was then his responsibility. Ghannouchi panicked but refused to go and he instead asked for a constitutional expert to explain to him what had to be done. Sik Salem then called General Ammar but was unable to reach him, because he had been transferred to the Interior Ministry. As his assistant called Parliament president, Fouad Mebazaa to bring him over to the palace, Sik Salem realized his only option was to go on air and share the news with the Tunisian people and he asked for a TV crew to be dispatched to the palace (Tadros, 2016, p. 10).
Distrustful of the military, when the Presidential Guard arrived at the base, they began aiming their guns at the military troops. Leila’s nephew had arrived at the base and begged Ben Ali to take him along. At the time, Lakhal had arrived at the airport to join Tarhouni, bringing the number of troops under his command to 170 of Tunisia’s best security personnel. Then, Tarhouni finally admitted to his friends that he had not received any orders and that they were on their own. The officers had little option but to continue with the operation (Tadros, 2016, p. 10-11). For Seriati, the participation of the specialized Unit of the National Guard in the hostage situation was the final straw since the National Guard had a nearby base with more than 300 men, and such a force could prevent the Presidential plane from taking off, making it unsafe for Ben Ali to remain at the base. Fearing the worst, Ben Ali decided to accompany his family to Saudi Arabia and then return. He called Grira and informed him of his decision adding that Seriati would accompany him but at the last minute, as he was boarding the plane, he asked Seriati to stay behind to make sure that his remaining daughter, Ghazwa found a plane out of the country (Tadros, 2016, p. 11).
As Ben Ali’s plane was about to depart, his Prime Minister Ghannouchi was still trying to figure out what to do. He called Grira who told him Ben Ali had only left temporarily, while he, in turn, informed Grira of what Sik Salem had told him. Grira could not imagine that Sik Salem, a low-ranking officer, had acted on his own without receiving orders, like Tarhouni. For Grira, Ghannouchi being called by someone from the Presidential Guard, only meant that Seriati was planning the whole thing. However, he was puzzled by how Seriati would conduct the coup when he was on the plane with Ben Ali and a few minutes later when he discovered that Seriati had not departed, he ordered his arrest for treason. As a subordinate informed Seriati that the Prime Minister and Parliament president were in the palace, it was his turn to believe a coup was being planned and being a professional officer, Seriati concluded this would only be possible if the military were behind it. Wishing to avoid bloodshed, Seriati ordered his guards back to the palace and surrendered to the military officers Grira had sent to arrest him, as he resigned himself to his fate. Finally, informed of the hostage situation in the airport, Sik Salem was similarly convinced that a military coup was underway (Tadros, 2016, p. 11).
At 6:44 PM, less than an hour after Ben Ali’s plane had departed, and after Parliament president, Mebazaa felt sick and refused to read the statement, the recorded tape of the reluctant Prime Minister informing Tunisians that he had temporarily assumed the powers of the presidency was aired on Tunisian National Television. 11 minutes later, Ben Ali called Ghannouchi from his plane to curse him but Ghannouchi assured him that it was the Presidential Guard who forced him to do it, that he would never betray him. Ghannouchi later requested a denial to be recorded of his statement to the nation, but the Presidential Guard officers refused. A few minutes later, Ghannouchi called Tarhouni asking if he was planning to become president. Half an hour later, Tarhouni handed over his hostages to the military in front of TV cameras and was later arrested by the military. The military which was still loyal to Ben Ali was planning on releasing the Trabelsis and help them get out of the country and they were only stopped by videos that quickly appeared on social media uploaded by Tarhouni’s men, showing the whole operation. With everyone confused as to who exactly was conducting a coup, Grira called General Ammar asking him if he was loyal to him; and Ammar angrily told his minister to leave him alone. Ben Ali in turn called Grira and Ammar, both of whom informed him that the situation was unclear (Tadros, 2016, p.12).
At 10:55 PM, Ben Ali’s plane landed in Jeddah. Determined to return as quickly as possible to Tunisia, he ordered the pilot to quickly refuel and prepare for their return trip. The pilot discovered for the first time what had taken place on a television screen, and decided he would not be Tunisia’s traitor returning Ben Ali to the country. In the meantime, the confused Tunisian officials gathered in a crisis meeting, unsure of what to do. Mistrusting one another, scared of each other and Ben Ali’s anger, and still convinced that someone must have been behind all the chaos, they all told their president that everything was Seriati’s fault; claiming that he was the one who had planned the whole thing. They agreed and planned to send a plane the next day for the president to come home. However, no plane would ever be sent (Tadros, 2016, p. 12). This marked the end of Ben Ali’s 23 years in power and it was perhaps the first time that an Arab dictator has been removed by a revolution rather than a coup.
The major causes of the revolution
Bouazizi’s death sparked the revolution but there are deep-rooted factors far beyond his death, that spurred Tunisian citizens to take to the streets in protests, and they go back several decades.
Corruption: Corruption in Ben Ali’s entourage was one of the major factors that led to the protests and revolution. Ben Ali’s entourage was the center of Ben Ali’s mafia-like power structure (Kaboub, 2013, p. 8). The entourage was part of the regime’s inner circle composed of “the palace” consisting of the President’s team of political advisors, close friends and family members; and “the lieutenants” consisting of Ben Ali’s most important executive team including powerful ministers, foreign affairs, international cooperation, social affairs, and economic affairs. The entourage consisted of Ben Ali’s family, his second wife’s family (the Trabelsis) and the families married to Ben Ali’s daughters (Chiboub, Mabrouk, Zarrouk and El Matri) and quickly expanded to let in the in-laws of the in-laws, all of whom became presidential relatives through marriage, and therefore had privileged access into the inner circle (Kaboub, 2013, p. 9). The inner circle’s political elites presiding over the RCD party structure also strengthened their political capital via marital and business affiliations with the Trabelsi-Ben Ali clan. Therefore, with time, the entourage started to dominate and overpower the lieutenants and apply the executive power of the palace in augmenting their economic power (Kaboub, 2013, p. 9).
A presidential executive order issued in 1992, made it mandatory for all major government contract bids to go through the President’s office; overpowering a committee of technical experts from various ministries tasked with selecting the winning bids for all major government project bids. The 1992 decision launched a long wave of corruption and kickbacks; and also coincided with Tunisia’s endorsement of the World Bank-Sponsored structural adjustment program mandating the privatization of several state-owned enterprises. All of this benefited the Ben Ali plutocracy (Kaboub, 2013, p. 9-10).
The Trabelsi-Ben Ali family accumulated a tremendous amount of wealth in a very short period and built a business empire (Kaboub, 2013, p. 9) where they owned over 180 companies in various industries such as banking, insurance, telecommunications, real estate, construction, transportation, retail, tourism, manufacturing, and mining. The companies were acquired through ignoring laws and/or creating new laws that put pressure on traditional business owners (Kaboub, 2011, p. 7). Unable to affiliate themselves with the presidential family through marriage and lacking the proper network connections to the Trabelsi-Ben Ali family, the traditional business owners and entrepreneurs suffered severely from the new regime structure. They were faced with three unpleasant options; to sell their business to the Trabelsi-Ben Ali family, to agree to partner with them (work for them) or face constant harassment by the government (tax audits, inspections) and unfair competition until driven out of business. The companies illegally secured quasi-monopoly deals, barely paid taxes and embezzled huge amounts of money and all this further concentrated economic power within the President’s entourage (Kaboub, 2013, p. 10). As the Trabelsi-Ben Ali clan was amassing billions of dollars, corruption devastated the economy and Tunisia’s middle class slid down the income ladder further (Kaboub, 2011, p. 7) and the former elites found themselves more isolated and alienated (Kaboub, 2013, p. 9). Corruption was on an individual level as well, as public officials harassed and demanded bribes from people, which was the case for Mohammed Bouazizi. On top of that, Ben Ali’s family gave jobs to people connected with the regime. This alienated the general public and contributed to the high unemployment rate among the youth.
Unemployment and inflation: Despite the economic boom in the 1990s, the unemployment rate remained the same; showing the poor distribution of wealth, income inequalities and diminishment of the economic status of the middle class (Kaboub, 2011, p. 7). Corruption and nepotism were the determining factors in obtaining work and this contributed to high unemployment rates and declining living conditions particularly among the youth. Bad economic policies led to high rates of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment (23%) and young graduate unemployment (37%), a decline in spending power, rising prices and growing household debt (Saidin, 2018, p. 71). Unemployment was higher for young women and in poorer regions especially the West of Tunisia (Nassar, 2016, p. 27). The factors of massive unemployment and declining living conditions were motives for the protests.
Political repression: Ben Ali’s regime was brutal and was characterized by a lack of freedom of the press. During the regime, all potential spaces for expression such as the media, research centers, and civil society organizations were shut down. Few political parties were tolerated, and only because they had got less than three percent of the votes. Refusing to respect human and civil rights, the regime also applied force to trample them systematically. The state security department excellent in securing and enforcing the political legitimacy of Ben Ali’s regime’s employed mafia-like methods imbued with resources and authority of a nation-kidnapping, blackmail, even torture and most likely murder which was probably the fate of many political prisoners who disappeared over the years. In early 2005, there was also the issue of extreme arrogance of Ben Ali, his family, and his government; with his family, particularly his wife, Leila Trabelsi practicing nepotism. By then, Ben Ali was beginning to become increasingly out of touch, was being hostile to criticisms and more close-minded. All political decisions were made by him (Saidin, 2018, p. 72) and for the execution of his orders, Ben Ali selected highly qualified apolitical technocrats but who lacked social and political capital to be his political rivals (Kaboub, 2013, p. 9).
Poverty and the declining cost of living: the middle-class status was primarily acquired through education and access to government jobs. Though throughout the economic liberalization period, the government continued to support education but cut back on hiring within various government ministries. Faced with the terrible reality of unemployment after college, there was a visible decline in the middle-class status. Controlled by the government, higher home mortgage rates with rapidly growing household debt also increased the burden of the middle class. Due to the household debt increase, Tunisian families became more dependent on worker remittances from abroad and the middle class’s economic status became more financially unstable (Kaboub, 2013, p. 13-14).
To stimulate private investment and foreign direct investment (FDI), the World Bank had put pressure on the Tunisian government to amend or abolish the Code de Travail and to replace it with a business-friendly legislation giving employers the freedom to hire and fire without restriction, only that much of the labor market flexibility resulted in the creation of a group of subcontracting companies (mostly owned by the Trabelsi-Ben Ali clan) operating on the margins of the Tunisian labor laws and relying exclusively on contractual workers (Kaboub, 2013, p. 11). Embracing the free-market policies, the government gradually withdrew its expenditures, leaving a significant gap to be filled by private investment only that the latter was mostly speculative thus incapable of absorbing the unemployed. Furthermore, through micro-financing schemes, the government focused on promoting self-employment and entrepreneurship; however, this led to an increase in indebtedness, defaults, and corruption. Then, the government broke its economic support ties to the middle class. As if that was not enough, the regime also increased its oppression, and with their interests drifting away from those of the elite, the middle class found themselves aligning more with the poor, the disenfranchised, the oppressed and the underground opposition (Kaboub, 2013, p. 14). The middle class grew dissatisfied with the rising cost of living and the declining living conditions.
Women during the 2011 revolution
Women were integral to the struggles that ousted Ben Ali’s regime, though the media gave little attention to their role (Mulrine, 2011, p. 17). Voicing their dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime, women were at the forefront of the 2011 Tunisian revolution. Women actively and visibly participated in all stages of the revolution as both organizers and demonstrators. Veiled with unveiled, old with young, educated with illiterate, peasants with intellectuals, Tunisian women of all ages, from different social classes and ideological backgrounds and all walks of life took to the streets to protest together with men, and together they confronted armed police and the secret police (Gondorová, 2014, p. 28; Şahin, 2013, p. 162). When not on the streets protesting, women actively contributed to the revolution through online activism and by supplying other protestors with food, medical aid, and in some cases, Molotov cocktails (ESCWA, 2013, p. 1) and through online activism by rallying people to participate, blogging and publishing photos and videos, organizing or reporting in real-time the events as they were unfolding and informing the rest of the world what was happening (which we’ll get back to later).
During the revolution, women maintained their classical gender roles in the household. In neighborhoods suffering from food shortage, women assisted by cooking for each other and sharing food; and in preparing food for demonstrators. Also, women organized and participated in neighborhood watches at night alongside men (Mulrine, 2011, p. 17). Sometimes, women even suggested that the men who spent the night keeping watch, stay at home to rest; while they (women) take care of protesting.
As did men, Tunisian women risked their lives in the streets; they were attacked, killed, injured, arrested, detained and suffered from the brutality and violence of the security forces to suppress protests. Having assigned itself the role of the champion of women, the presence of the emphasized women among protesters – like on 6th January, when female lawyers appeared in demonstrations together with male lawyers – represented an important challenge to the legitimacy of Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime and opted and triggered what is deemed to be a highly effective tool: gendered violence (Johansson-Nogués, 2013, p. 399). Thus, women became victims of sexual assault and harassment from security forces, targeted at them in an attempt to break down their spirit (Gondorová, 2014, p. 28; FIDH, 2012, p. 8). The ATFD and the National Council for Civil Liberties’ reports that in the final days of Ben Ali’s regime, women became victims of sexual harassment or rape at the hands of the security forces (Johansson-Nogués, 2013, p. 399) stating that in Kasserine and Thela, members of Ben Ali’s Special Forces raped girls on 11th and 12th January; and from 14th to 15th January, in Tunis, several women protesters held in detention in the Interior Ministry were raped (FIDH, 2012, p. 9). And on 29th January, groups of men assaulted women protesting while shouting at them “to return to their kitchens” (FIDH, 2012, p. 9).
Also, social media played a big role during the revolution, women played an integral part in online activism. Women participated in the revolution through cyber activism using Facebook, Twitter and blogs to connect, organize, mobilize and share information online (Gondorová, 2014, p. 28; Landorf, 2014, p. 20; Mulrine, 2011, p. 18). Besides sharing the same gender, Tunisian female cyberactivists made up various groups of citizens; they were activists, citizen journalists, feminists, academics, bloggers, photographers, and so on; within Tunisia and in the Diaspora, posting in French, English, and Arabic and with an audience spanning from local to national to international (Landorf, 2014, p. 85). It is difficult to give an estimation of how many women participated in cyberactivism because they disguised themselves with male pseudonyms or anonymity, but here are a few examples whom their online presence and activism were highly noticeable.
Lina Ben Mhenni, a well-known critic of former Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, is one of the few cyberactivists who used her real name and identity and discussed political issues in Tunisia on her blog, A Tunisian Girl, and her social media accounts (Facebook page and Twitter account) thus they were censored several times by the government. However, that did not discourage her; for in early January, under the title “You Can’t Stop Us from Writing”, she posted a screenshot of her Facebook page that had been hacked by the government (Landorf, 2014, p. 75). When foreign journalists were banned and the National media was censored by the government, Mhenni uploaded photos and videos, summarized the protests on her media sites and transmitted firsthand information about what was happening in Tunisia (Landorf, 2014, p. 73). She traveled to Sidi Bouzid and by using photos, she reported the brutal attacks of the security forces on the protesters (ESCWA, 2013, p. 3). On 19th December, Mhenni tweeted and posted on her blog “Sidi Bouzid is burning”, followed by a screenshot of the viral video of Bouazizi’s self-immolation and concluded with a call to protest (Landorf, 2014, p. 55). With over 80,000 Facebook page followers and 40,000 Twitter followers, Mhenni connected Tunisian activists with international journalists and protesters on the ground and extended to an international audience, ensuring that the government could not censor the events happening in Tunisia (Landorf, 2014, p. 56).
Aya Chebbi documented women’s participation in protests with a photo journal of protests entitled “La Femme Tunisienne au Coeur de la Révolution” which she kept on Flickr, and she blogged about women’s right. After Ben Ali’s fall, she launched Proudly Tunisian, which became popular with her most viewed blog posts discussing the revolution and gender equality in Tunisia. She noted that what kept her away from publishing a blog before the revolution was fear of political reprisal against her and her family, as her father was a general in the Tunisian army (Landorf, 2014, p. 76-77).
A female-identified cyberactivist writing under the name Mon Massir used her widespread audience and influence online and mobilized her audience to protest. Before the revolution, she discussed Arab feminism and her reflections on culture, society, philosophy, and art but during the revolution, she changed and engaged in political activism urging Tunisians to log online, be informed about events happening in Tunisia and join the protests (Landorf, 2014, p. 76).
Online activism created a new space somewhat removed from the threat of physical violence and where people from diverse backgrounds interact and connect (Landorf, 2014, p. 35) and so, as gendered violence increased on the streets, blogs provided that new space for women to continue protesting. 7ellblog launched in November 2010, encouraged Tunisians to blog despite censorship and this increased female participation online (Landorf, 2014, p. 78). On 14th January, Arabasta3 posted on 7ellblog, urging the blogging community to start writing and speak out on radio and television (Landorf, 2014, p. 75).
Tunisian female cyberactivists constituted a diverse group of citizens and were instrumental in the revolution. When the Tunisian media and international news sources failed to document the unfolding protests, blogs replaced them (Landorf, 2014, p. 72) and the outcome was the transition from online activism to physical participation in the streets of Tunisia (Landorf, 2014, p. 75). Despite the presence of gender violence, Tunisian female cyberactivists translated online activism into physical protests in the streets (Landorf, 2014, p. 23). Their collective action found a sense of empowerment and a new voice that cannot be taken away and are fighting back (ESCWA, 2013, p. 18).
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